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3
C3 Who’s on First?
Daniel Wodak
C3.P1 A: Strange as it may seem, they give ball players nowadays very
peculiar names.
C3.P2 C: Funny names?
C3.P3 A: Nicknames, nicknames. Now, on the St. Louis team we have
Who’s on first, What’s on second, I Don’t Know is on
third—
C3.P4 C: That’s what I want to find out. I want you to tell me the
names of the fellows on the St. Louis team.
C3.P5 A: I’m telling you. Who’s on first, What’s on second, I Don’t
Know is on third—
C3.P6 C: You know the fellows’ names?
C3.P7 A: Yes.
C3.P8 C: Well, then who’s playing first?
C3.P9 A: Yes.
C3.P10 C: I mean the fellow’s name on first base.
C3.P11 A: Who.
C3.P12 (From Abbott and Costello’s skit, “Who’s on First.”)
C3.P13 “X-Firsters” hold that some normative feature is fundamental to all others.
This is a common view. As Mark Schroeder wrote in Slaves of the Passions,
C3.P14 for centuries [metaethicists] have characterized their subject matter as being every-
thing which ultimately involved claims about what was good, or . . . what was right,
or . . . what someone ought to do. All of these views claim that what it is for a
property or concept to be normative, is for it to be ultimately analyzable in terms of
some basic normative property or relation or concept. They merely disagree about
what this basic property or concept is. (2007: 81)
C3.P15 Much ink has been spilled in the “mere” disagreements about what this
basic property is. This is the internecine debate between X-Firsters, especially
between Reasons Firsters (e.g. Parfit 2011; Scanlon 1998), Values Firsters
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(e.g. Moore 1903; Maguire 2016), and Fittingness Firsters (e.g. Chappell
2012; McHugh and Way 2016).
C3.P16 To some, this internecine debate resembles an Abbott and Costello skit.
In saying this I do not intend to cast aspersions on interesting, insightful
work that has developed problems and solutions for specific X-First views.
Rather, I intend to draw attention to something about the debate itself. It
takes as a starting point that some normative feature is fundamental to all
others. Little to nothing is said about whether or why we should think that.
C3.P17 That said, to my knowledge there has been no clear argument against
the X-First program,¹ and no clear articulation of an alternative to it either.
Hence my two main goals in this chapter. First, I provide a fairly simple
argument that one shouldn’t be an X-Firster about the normative domain.
The central move is to show that X-First theories have dubious merits
when applied to a range of analogous domains. Second, I offer an alternative
to X-First views. I develop an approach—taking normativity to be a
determinable—that provides a stark contrast with X-First views, especially
in how it treats the structure and unity of normativity.
C 3 . S 1 3.1. WHAT IS IT FOR SOMETHING
TO BE “ON FIRST” ?
C3.P18 Before we proceed to these two main goals, it’s worth covering our bases.
What exactly are X-Firsters committed to? I’ll start with Reasons First, zoom
out to characterize X-First itself, then offer two clarifications.
C3.P19 Reasons First is, roughly, the view that reasons are “the only fundamental
elements of the normative domain, other normative notions such as good
and ought being analyzable in terms of reasons” (Scanlon 2014: 2). Selim
Berker argues that this “widely popular” approach is most aptly framed in
terms of two theses about grounding: that “reasons are first,” or all other
normative “facts are grounded in facts about reasons, that it is in virtue of the
facts about reasons that these other normative facts obtain”; and that
“reasons are not tied for first,” or “it is not because of any facts about other
normative categories that facts about reasons obtain” (2017: 15-16).
C3.P20 Generalizing, the X-First program takes some X, and declares it to be
prior to all Ys. What’s X? A paradigmatic normative property (or relation or
concept or . . . ). The three most common candidates are reasons, fitting-
ness, and value. But others are possible—e.g. ought.²
¹ Though skepticism has been aired: see e.g. Cuneo (2007: 64–5; Väyrynen (2011: 203).
² See also Wodak (forthcoming) on views like Broome‘s (2013)—which may just
answer a local question in the sense described below. It’s also noteworthy here that X-
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C3.P21 What are all the Ys? All of the other normative properties (or relations or
concepts or . . . ). Here we obviously need a demarcation of the normative.
I suspect X-Firsters have a narrow demarcation in mind,³ but since little is
typically said on this score I won’t discuss it further.
C3.P22 Note also that X can be prior to all the Ys even if some Z is prior to X.
Reasons Firsters can allow that all facts about reasons are fully grounded, so
long as they are fully grounded in non-normative facts (as Berker notes 2017:
16). More generally, X-First is compatible with both naturalism and non-
naturalism.Modulo questions about what terms like “priority” mean here—
it’s compatible with expressivism. Consider Gibbard: “W I regard as
the basic normative concept, the conceptual atom that renders molecular
concepts like  normative” (2006: 196–7).
C3.P23 Two further theses are sometimes classed with X-First. The first concerns
local questions of explanatory priority, such as: Is the good prior to the right,
or vice versa? The good can be prior to the right (or vice versa) without being
prior to all other normative properties. X-Firsters sometimes count as allies
historical figures who only answer local questions, but those figures seem to
be playing a different ballgame.
C3.P24 Gibbard’s quote above points to the second thesis. For Gibbard,
 is not just the atomic normative concept out of which other
normative concepts are constructed; it is what renders those other concepts
normative. More generally, X-Firsters might be committed to there being
some X that other normative properties have in common, in virtue of which
they are normative. Call this the thesis that some X is “the mark of the
normative.”⁴
C3.P25 Like others,⁵ the Schroeder quote that we started with entangles both
issues (“what it is for a property or concept to be normative, is for it to be
ultimately analyzable in terms of some basic normative property”). But they
should be separated. For instance, Raz has endorsed the view that “the
normativity of all that is normative consists in the way it is, or provides, or is
Firsters standardly take a commonsensical (rather than some recherché) normative notion
to be what’s on first. Thanks to Francois Schroeter for discussion.
³ X-Firsters focus on what we can call “authoritative” normative properties; they’re
silent on how we explain “merely formal normativity” (McPherson 2011; Wodak 2019).
⁴ To accommodate views like Raz’s (discussed later), the “mark of the normative” thesis
needs to be framed somewhat broadly: for all Y, Y is normative iff Y is related in “the right
way” to X. It’s unclear how to cash this out. (What does Raz mean by “otherwise related to
reasons”?) Thanks to Selim Berker and Gabriel Shapiro for helpful discussions here.
⁵ Consider Snedegar (2016: 156): a central “appeal of the reasons first program is that
it promises to explain what it is that makes the normative normative”; but this “really only
motivate[s] taking some single notion to be normatively basic.” This assumes a great deal:
that we can explain what it is that makes the normative normative only by taking there to
be a mark of the normative, and that the mark of the normative must be on first.
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otherwise related to reasons” (1999: 67); but he has also endorsed the view
that facts about practical reasons are explained in terms of facts about value.⁶
These commitments don’t seem inconsistent. So while Raz is often classed
with Reasons Firsters, this is a mistake. The commitments about explana-
tory priority are definitive of the X-First program, I think. That said, there’s
no use fighting over terminology. The crucial point is the distinction
between the claim that some normative X is on first and the claim that
some normative X is the mark of the normative, so defined. I’ll discuss both
claims, but mostly focus on the first.
C 3 . S 2 3.2. IS SOMETHING “ON FIRST” ?
C3.S3 3.2.1. The Goal
C3.P26 My first goal is to argue that one shouldn’t be X-Firsters. But that’s
ambiguous between two claims.
C3.P27 X-F ’ F: We should not assume that there’s some
X that’s “on first” for normativity.
C3.P28 X-F  F: It’s false that there’s some X that’s “on first” for
normativity.
C3.P29 I am somewhat sympathetic to the second claim, and some of what I’ll say
can be marshalled in its defense. My case for the first claim is stronger.
C3.P30 Some may think the first claim is a weak target. But it’s dialectically
significant if I can provide a good case that X-F ’ F is true.
The X-First debate takes as a starting point that some normative feature is
fundamental to all others. More specifically: the X-First debate proceeds via
arguments for preferred X-First views (e.g. Reasons First) that are just
arguments against rival X-First views (e.g. Values First). These arguments
obviously rely on the assumption that some X is on first. If we shouldn’t
assume that, the whole debate is built on sand.
C3.P31 Some X-Firsters might find this characterization of the debate to be unfair.
Some X-Firsters explicitly say they aren’t assuming that some X is on first.⁷ And
some may say that they are defending that claim, not assuming it.
⁶ For discussion and references, see Heuer (2004), especially at 133: for Raz, “we have
reasons to act in certain ways because so acting is an appropriate response to value.”
⁷ See e.g. McHugh and Way (2016: 577): “Why expect that there will be some basic
normative or evaluative property from which the rest of the normative and evaluative
domain is constructed? We do not assume from the outset that this is so.” (I discuss the
“significant attractions” they attribute to this “hypothesis” in n. 20.) Cf. Rowland (2017:
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C3.P32 Two responses. One, X-Firsters sometimes hedge, but that doesn’t fit
with the conclusions they draw. Consider Howard (2019). Howard argues
for Fittingness First by arguing that Reasons First and Values First are
unacceptable. If Howard grants that we have no good reason from the
onset to think that some X is on first—or, more specifically, that reasons
or values or fittingness is on first—his argument can’t be for The Funda-
mentality of Fit (which is his title). It can only be for the less interesting
conditional claim: if reasons or values or fittingness is fundamental then
fittingness is fundamental. Either the antecedent of that conditional is
assumed to get to a stronger conclusion, or X-Firsters’ conclusions aren’t
as interesting as their titles suggest. Pick your poison.
C3.P33 My second response may initially seem like a curve ball, but bear with me.
Alonzo Church once considered a view he called “ontological misogyny.”
One form of this view would explain all facts about women in terms of facts
about men plus the being a father of relation. As Church noted, this view
may give us adequate resources to express all facts about women, but if so
that doesn’t seem like a good argument for the doctrine.⁸ Now compare this
to X-Firsters’ arguments views for their preferred views. Chappell’s main
argument for taking fittingness to be “primitive” is that this provides
“adequate conceptual resources for us to express any expressible normative
truth” (2012: 686). Does that really show that fittingness is “The Sole
Normative Primitive”? Or that there is any “Sole Normative Primitive”?
No. The point here is simple. X-Firsters often aim to show that we can put
some X on first for normativity (without losing expressive power or exten-
sional adequacy). But so what? That we can does not mean that we should.
If ontological misogyny lets us express any expressible truth about gender,
that does not mean that men are “on first” with respect to gender, or indeed
that there is any Sole Gender Primitive. (If Church’s example is too out of
left field, we could make similar points concerning e.g. logical concepts. See
McSweeney (2019) on this issue: we can take ‘∀’, ‘&’, and ‘~’ to be the sole
logical primitives without losing expressive power or extensional adequacy;
that doesn’t mean we should ! )
C3.P34 Let me put the preceding points differently. The stronger conclusion
X-F  F rejects every X-First view. The weaker conclusion X-F
’ F rejects the X-First debate. As Schroeder put it, everyone in
the debate agrees that that there’s some basic normative property and
“merely disagrees” about what it is; so that starting point is some X is on
213, emphasis mine), who assumes that “We should accept an account of the basic
normative property that enables us to analyze the evaluative in terms of the normative.”
⁸ For references for Church’s 1958 talk, see Inwagen (2004: 123).
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first, and we argue from there to work out whether X is reasons or values or
whatever. If X-F ’ F, X-Firsters owe us much more.
C3.S4 3.2.2. The Argumentative Strategy
C3.P35 There are domains where X-First views seem plausible. Take rectangles. For
any shape, if it’s a rectangle, this is in virtue of its being equiangular-and-
quadrilateral. That conjunctive property is “on first” for rectangles.
C3.P36 Perhaps normativity is like rectangles. But many domains that are analo-
gous to normativity don’t look like rectangles in this respect. This is the
basis for my master argument against X-Firsters:
C3.P37 P1. We should not have an X-First debate for Z.
C3.P38 P2. If P1, we should not have an X-First debate about normativity.
C3.P39 C. So, we should not have an X-First debate about normativity.
C3.P40 There are different instances of this argument, depending on which domain
we focus on—i.e. what candidate for Z we consider.⁹ I’ll consider a few
different candidates below. I don’t need each of them to succeed, obviously;
if one version of the argument is sound, that’d suffice. But it’s valuable to
consider a range of candidates to see how much the X-First debate in
metaethics seems like an aberration in philosophy. This sociological obser-
vation will do some work in the argument below.
C3.P41 Here’s the first candidate for Z: the mental. Considering P1 helps us
elucidate a curious feature of X-First theories. You might think they are
simply monistic theories: they just require a single property to be funda-
mental to normativity. But that’s not right. They require a single normative
entity to be fundamental to normativity. The equivalent view in philosophy
of mind is that there’s a single mental property that’s fundamental to the
mental. This involves something like a Beliefs First theory of the mental.
There are theories in this ballpark. Maybe ideas or intentionality are “on
first.” But there are well-known and widely accepted theories, like function-
alism, which don’t have this structure.¹⁰ We have theoretical resources—
like Ramsey sentences—to explicate the intuitive idea that the most basic
mental concepts like  and  might be interdependent, such that
no mental X is “on first.” It would be a mistake to set aside all views like
⁹ I’m using “domains” roughly in the way that Scanlon (2014) does, but nothing hangs
on the term. It may be more apt to speak of normativity as a category. (Interestingly, for “the
highest kinds” in Aristotle’s Categories, like qualities, no X is “on first”—or so I’m told.)
¹⁰ One way of thinking about functionalism is that to be a mental property is to be a
realizer of a certain functional role that’s specified via a Ramsey sentence. But the single
entity “on first” (a) isn’t mental, and (b) is a recherché second-order property. Cf. n. 15.
Thanks to Jan Dowell and Laura Schroeter for helpful discussion here.
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functionalism and construct a central debate in philosophy of mind to only
be between theories like Beliefs First.
C3.P42 Now consider P2. One point in its favor: if we need not be X-Firsters
about the mental, why must the normative be so different from the mental?
X-Firsters have an explanatory debt here. (I’ll expand on this below.) Here’s
another point in its favor. Considering views like functionalism helps us set
aside a wide set of considerations that might seem like putative advantages of
being an X-Firster about normativity: that such views are simpler, or more
conducive to a naturalistic reduction (e.g. Schroeder 2007: 81). Is function-
alism less simple, or less reductionist-friendly, than views like “Intentionality
First”? If so, is that a good ground to reject functionalism and agree from the
onset to only consider views like Intentionality First? Once we attend to
theoretical positions that don’t fit the strictures of an X-First program, it’s
hard to see why general theoretical virtues (or an appetite for reduction)
should be a good motivation for that program.
C3.P43 Let’s turn to a more obvious candidate for Z: descriptivity. By this I mean
the facts, properties, etc. that fall on the “is” side of Hume’s is/ought gap.
This is a motley crew. Numbers and narwhals, sensations and supernatural
beings, photons and pharmacies, Germany and gravity: if they all exist, they
are all descriptive. Must there be some descriptive property, X, that is prior
to all other descriptive properties (that some descriptive X is “on first”), and
that all other descriptive entities have in virtue of which they are descriptive
(that there’s a “mark of the descriptive”)? If so, what would X be? What is
the equivalent of being equiangular-and-quadrilateral for numbers, narwhals,
photons, and so on?
C3.P44 Any candidate for X would be highly contentious. Consider dualism: the
mental and the physical are plausibly both descriptive, but dualists say
they’re fundamentally different. Can an X-Firster about descriptivity respect
that commitment? If the mental and the physical are like isosceles and
oblique triangles, are they really fundamentally different? A similar concern
arises for abstracta and concreta (Rosen 2017; Thomasson 1999).¹¹
C3.P45 Say I’m right about P1. Why believe P2? Because normativity and
descriptivity are meant to carve an important joint in reality. If the hetero-
geneous stuff on one side, descriptivity, does not fit the mold of an X-First
theory, why should the heterogeneous stuff on the other? Even if we could
entertain some X-First theories for descriptivity, we shouldn’t construct a
debate comparing them and taking the best of the bunch to be the true
theory of descriptivity. So why have that debate for normativity?
¹¹ Consider e.g. the view that the essential descriptive feature is having causal powers.
Adopting such an Eleatic Principle is hard to square with abstracta and dualist views.
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C3.P46 I suspect that most objections to this argument will target P2. You may
think, for instance, that it’s a mistake to posit a descriptive property that’s
“on first,” but only because being descriptive is primarily a feature of
sentences or propositions, rather than of properties or relations. But similar
motivations for taking descriptivity to be primarily a feature of sentences or
propositions can be marshalled in favor of taking normativity to be primarily
a feature of (uses of) sentences or propositions. Why should X-Firsters treat
normativity and descriptivity so differently?
C3.P47 A better way to reject P2 is to argue that “descriptivity” is just the grab-
bag of whatever is not normative. If this is so, of course P2 will be false! It’s
like saying rectangles need not have any essential feature because there is no
essential feature for the heterogenous collection of non-rectangles.
C3.P48 But is it so? I’m not sure. Something can be rectangular or non-
rectangular, but not both. But it’s at least coherent to take something to
be normative and descriptive. So the distinction between the descriptive and
the normative doesn’t seem akin to the distinction between rectangles and
non-rectangles: “descriptive” means something other than “not normative.”
C3.P49 Even if one sympathizes with such objections, however, the X-Firster isn’t
home. The objections only target one version of the argument. They don’t
help with the mental. Nor do they help with our final candidate for Z: the
physical. Being physical is clearly not a feature of sentences or propositions in
the way that being descriptive might be. And the domain or category of the
physical is, it’s safe to say, not some grab-bag of leftovers.
C3.P50 So, should we have an X-First debate about the category of the physical?
Is there some physical X that’s prior to all other physical properties and
relations (some physical X that’s “on first”)? There’s some precedent for this
view. Thales of Miletus—perhaps the first philosopher—held that every-
thing is water. On this Water First view, water is a “primary principle” of all
things like the sun, the stars, and the cosmos. But this Water First theory is
false. And it’s not just false because water itself is not fundamental to
physics—that is, we didn’t just learn it was false when we discovered that
water is H₂O. One way to see this is to think of some more contemporary
counterparts to Thales’ view about physics. A Photons First ontology for the
physical may not be threatened by a discovery like Lavoisier’s, but we still
know that it’s a non-starter. Why? For one thing, physical entities include
material things like molecules and non-material things like forces. If there
are “fundamental physical forces,” the prospects for anything like a Photons
First ontology are dim.¹² (This is part of what led materialists to become
¹² Some may endorse a Particles First or Fields First ontology of the physical. But the
correspondence to an X-First theory here is superficial. Being committed to a plurality of
fundamental particles (photons, bosons, whatever) or a plurality of fundamental fields
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physicalists in philosophy.) A similar point applies to the view that there
some X that all physical entities have in virtue of which they are physical (i.e.
some X that’s “the mark of the physical”). There’s a debate about what
makes entities physical (see Stoljar 2017: §§11–12). But it does not resem-
ble the X-First debate—there’s no agreement from the onset that some X is
“the mark of the physical.”
C3.P51 This is why the case for P1 here is strong: X-First theories about the
physical are implausible, and we certainly shouldn’t assume that one is right.
The case for P2 is just as strong as before. The distinction between the
normative and the descriptive is often used because of a taxonomical
consideration in the naturalism vs. non-naturalism debate. One way of
denying the fundamentality of the normative is to claim that normativity
is ultimately explained in terms of the supernatural, which is descriptive but
not physical. But much of what drives naturalism about normativity drives
one towards physicalism (at least, ceteris paribus); a distinct realm of sui
generis normative stuff raises similar concerns to a distinct realm of sui generis
supernatural or mathematical or mental stuff. If so, the normative and the
physical are playing similar roles as philosophical domains.
C3.S5 3.2.3. The Sociological Observation
C3.P52 These three candidates—the descriptive, physical, and mental—hardly
exhaust the categories which are similar to the normative, but don’t have
anything resembling the X-First debate in metaethics. (For instance: once
vitalism was rejected, it has become unclear if there’s any essential feature
that all animate beings have in virtue of which they’re animate.) In this
sense, the X-First debate in metaethics is something of an aberration in
philosophy.¹³ And this sociological observation warrants an explanation:
why does the X-First debate have pride of place in metaethics if there aren’t
analogous debates about these analogous philosophical categories?
C3.P53 Here are three possible explanations for this sociological observation:
C3.P54 (i) Pessimism about X-First Views: The X-First debate is built on sand.
C3.P55 (ii) Normative Exceptionalism: We have to be X-Firsters about normativity,
but not about these other philosophical categories.
(electromagnetism, maybe gravity, some poorly named ones) is being committed to the
kind of fundamentally disjunctive account that X-Firsters want to reject. See section 3.3.
¹³ It’s not quite an anomaly. Attempts to reduce all mathematical entities to sets or
categories are arguably similar to X-First theories about normativity. (Though I do not
think sets were thought to be “the mark of the mathematical” in this literature.) That said,
there was no assumption in this literature that some view like Sets First must be true.
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C3.P56 (iii) Revisionism about the Non-normative: We need, and sorely lack, X-First
debates about these other philosophical categories.
C3.P57 I think the best explanation is the first: we should think either that X-First
views are false, or (more modestly) that the X-First debate is misguided. Just
as there may be an essential mental feature, there may be an essential
normative feature. But there’s no cause to agree from the onset that there
is an essential normative feature and merely disagree about what it is.
C3.P58 X-Firsters may wish to take the second option. But if so, they really need
to step up to the plate and give us arguments that explain what makes the
normative exceptional. This requires more than throwaway remarks. We
need an explanation for why whatever motivates being an X-Firster about
normativity doesn’t motivate being an X-Firster across the board. If we
baldly declare that X-First theories are always preferred on grounds like
simplicity, we take on odd commitments about e.g. functionalism.
C3.P59 I find the third option to be the least appealing. If it’s the right way to go,
my argumentative strategy won’t have yielded the fruit that I expected, but
it will have led to something surprising and significant nonetheless: there’s
an enormous amount of new work to be done in almost every field.
C3.P60 This observation, then, poses a simple challenge for X-Firsters. Note that
it’s not a direct challenge to the arguments that preoccupy the literature
(whether Fittingness First is a better view than Reasons First or Values First,
and so on). It’s a challenge to an inference from such arguments to the
conclusion that the preferred X-First theory about normativity is true.
Unless more is said, it’s unclear if those arguments show us much more
than the argument that Photons First is a better theory than Water First, or
that Intentionality First is a better theory than Berkeleyan idealism.
C 3 . S 6 3.3. WHAT IF NOTHING IS “ON FIRST” ?
C3.P61 If I’m right about the X-First debate, how should we theorize about
normativity instead? Currently we lack any systematic work on what alter-
natives to X-First views about normativity can and should look like.
C3.P62 There’s plenty of space for many different rivals to X-First views. The
alternative I present below is by no means the only way to go, or indeed the
way we should go about all philosophically interesting categories. I’m going
to go in to bat for it because it provides a particularly sharp contrast with X-
First research programs, and in doing so offers an interesting, fruitful way to
think about some of the considerations that I suspect are driving metaethi-
cists towards embracing X-First theories. I’ll initially present a clearer, albeit
more committed, version of this view, then show how we might be able to
water down some of its commitments.
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C3.S7 3.3.1. Two Kinds of Categories
C3.P63 Let’s start by contrasting two kinds of categories. Some are genera. Following
Rosen (2010: 124–7), it is definitive of genera and species that:
C3.P64 For all x, that x is a member of species y is fully explained in terms of x
having the genus’s essential feature(s) and species’s differentia.
C3.P65 Recall the example of rectangles: they all have one essential feature in
common, namely being equiangular-and-quadrilateral. ABCD is member
of a species of this genus, a square, in virtue of having this essential feature
plus the requisite differentia (being equilateral).
C3.P66 But not all categories are genera. Some, for instance, are determinables.
C3.P67 Here’s how Rosen (2010: 127) contrasts genera and determinables:
C3.P68 [D]espite the similarities between the determinable–determinate rela-
tion on the one hand and the genus–species relation on the other,
there is this difference: the determinate grounds the determinable, but
the species does not ground the genus.
C3.P69 Take a scarlet letter. Scarlet is a determinate of red, which is in turn a
determinate of color. So the letter is red in virtue of being scarlet, and
colored in virtue of being red. It is not scarlet in virtue of having some
essential feature that colored things share, plus some differentia. On a
common—though by no means universal—approach, the facts about a
determinable are fully explained in terms of the facts about the disjunction
of its determinates (see Wilson 2017: §3.4.1).¹⁴ So on this approach, we can
have fundamentally disjunctive accounts of determinables such as color.
C3.P70 Three quick asides. First, I’m going to assume this common approach to
determinables, though little hangs on it; the main alternative doesn’t help
X-Firsters.¹⁵ Second, I’m going to play fast and loose with talk of explaining
F (e.g. explaining the determinable color) and explaining the facts about
F (e.g. explaining the facts about color); you’ll live. And third, I’m going to
speak of taking normativity to be a determinable below; take such talk as a
¹⁴ I should note that Wilson rejects this view (2012, 2014: 557); though cf. Bennett
(2017: 23–4), who notes that Wilson most plausibly points out that it is not universally
true that determinables are explained in terms of the disjunction of their determinates.
¹⁵ On the most salient alternative, “each determinable property F of ordinary individ-
uals is associated with a second-order property of properties: the property of being an F-
determinate” (Rosen 2010: 129). If normativity is a determinate, for x to be normative
would be for x to instantiate the second-order property of being a normativity determin-
ate. This fits the letter but not the spirit of an X-First theory: there is a single second-order
property that’s “on first,” but it’s not a paradigmatic normative property like being
valuable; it’s highly recherché. So doesn’t really vindicate the aims of X-Firsters.
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convenient shorthand for taking some more precise property—e.g. being
normatively valanced—to be a determinable.¹⁶
C3.S8 3.3.2. The Stark Alternative
C3.P71 Genera and determinables don’t exhaust the kinds of categories. But they
provide a stark contrast that’s useful for our purposes (though accepting an
X-First view isn’t identical to accepting that normativity is a genus).¹⁷ My
proposal is that normativity is a determinable, and it reduces to the disjunc-
tion of its determinates. On this view, no single normative feature is “on
first” (red and blue are explained in terms of different more specific colors),
and no X is “the mark of the normative” (explanations of why something is
normative, like explanations of why something is colored, will bottom out in
different specific determinates of the determinable).
C3.P72 Call this Stark Alternative. Views in the ballpark have been endorsed by
Tappolet (2004) and Oddie (2005), and suggested by Jessica Wilson (2014:
547), who noted that we could formulate normative naturalism as the view
that “normative state types and/or tokens stand in something like the
determinable/determinate relation to naturalistic goings-on.” This brings
out that the determinates of normativity could be naturalistic. But they
could also be other normative state types and/or tokens. In order for the
view to be compatible with naturalism or non-naturalism, Stark Alternative—
like X-First—must remain somewhat schematic.
C3.P73 To put some flesh on the bones of this schema, here’s a version of the
view. It’s inspired by Susan Hurley’s discussion of “centralism”:
C3.P74 A feature common to many philosophical accounts of ethical concepts is that the
general concepts, right and ought, are taken to be logically prior to and independent
of the specific concepts, such as just and unkind. According to such accounts, the
general concepts carry a core meaning . . . that also provides the specific concepts
with reason-giving status. . . . I shall refer to accounts that take the general concepts
in some category to be logically prior to and independent of the specific as centralist.
(Hurley 1985: 56)
¹⁶ When someone says color is a determinable, they don’t mean that a ball is color in
virtue of being red. Likewise, when I say normativity is a determinable, I don’t mean that
an act is normativity in virtue of being morally right. That said, being normatively valanced
may not be the best candidate for the determinable here. Inter alia, there’s a thorny issue
of whether being permitted should be among the relevant class of determinates. (This issue
is thorny because of the role it plays in a preposterous argument against error theory.)
¹⁷ For one, there could be an essential non-normative property or relation that is
essential to normativity: that could vindicate the view that normativity is a genus, but
could not vindicate X-Firsters. For another, the relevant essential feature and differentia
could both be normative, which would mean that no single normative notion is “on first.”
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C3.P75 Hurley suggests that instead of being centralists we should take “discrete
particular values as a starting point” (1985: 56). Following her use of
examples like justice and kindness, we could take specific virtues as deter-
minates of normativity. This gives us a Virtues First account. Hurley’s
remarks only touch on moral normativity, but one could generalize: the
view dovetails nicely with virtue-theoretic approaches to epistemology, for
instance. This may seem to resemble Reasons First, but the resemblance
is superficial. Virtues First is disjunctive: Hurley’s whole point is that we
do not take a “general concept” like  to be what’s “on first”; rather
normativity will bottom out in a list of “specific concepts” like  and
.¹⁸
C3.P76 I don’t know whether Virtues First is the best option to take for those
who are attracted to Stark Alternative. I’m just using it to illustrate the kind
of options that become available on this schematic approach. According to
Virtues First, the explanation for why something is normative will resemble
the explanation for why something is colored. Being courageous is a specific
way of being practically virtuous and being conscientious is a specific way of
being epistemically virtuous, just as being scarlet is a specific way of being
red and being azure is a specific way of being blue.
C3.S9 3.3.3. Why Accept Stark Alternative?
C3.P77 Good question, subheading. Here’s your answer. Stark Alternative better
accounts for what motivates X-Firsters in how it explains how normativity is
both structured and unified.¹⁹
C3.P78 One motivation for X-Firsters is that normativity is structured: relations of
explanatory priority or relative fundamentality obtain between reasons and
oughts and values and so on.²⁰ Of course, X-Firsters disagree about the
direction of those relations of explanatory priority. But they agree that these
¹⁸ Interestingly, the Virtues First view is neither Aristotelian nor neo-Aristotelian. See
Hirji (forthcoming) on the structure of each of those views: neither puts the aretaic “on
first.” It is also not Hurley’s view. Hurley embraces a kind of Rawlsian coherentism.
¹⁹ There are also some off-the-shelf arguments that I could appeal to in motivating
Stark Alternative, e.g. Armstrong (1997: 50) about asymmetric necessitation; see also
Wilson (2012: 8). I won’t appeal to those arguments. I don’t like them.
²⁰ That consideration is clear in Schroeder (2018)’s reconstruction of the motivation
behind Reasons First: since Ross (1930), many thought that reasons explain oughts, then
generalized from the “core case” of ought: reasons are prior to the rest of normativity. The
same consideration crops up with Fittingness Firsters like McHugh andWay (2016: 577):
since “the normative and evaluative domain seems highly interconnected, the hypothesis
that there is one basic normative property has significant explanatory promise.” They say
nothing about why it is attractive to explain these interconnections by taking one X to be on
first; they don’t seem to countenance that interconnectedness is otherwise explicable.
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explanations all bottom out in the same place: some highly general feature
like reasons or fittingness or value. However, Stark Alternative also accepts
that normativity is structured. By analogy: color is a determinable which is
explained in terms of its determinates like red and blue, which are them-
selves determinables that are explained in terms of their determinates like
crimson and cerulean. So according to Stark Alternative, normative explan-
ations bottom out in different highly specific places—e.g. on the Virtues
First view, in courage and conscientiousness.
C3.P79 So far this only shows that a motivation for X-First is neutralized, and in a
way that further supports a point I made earlier: the good can be prior to the
right without having to be prior to every other normative property. Further,
I want to argue that Stark Alternative is a more plausible account of the
structure of normativity than X-First. Our views about how normativity is
structured should be in sync with our views about the pattern of normative
explanations. If some X is “on first,” the pattern of the explanation for why x
is morally right or aesthetically good is like the pattern of explaining why
ABC is an isosceles triangle or an oblique triangle: we start with one general
property (being trilateral) then build to the specific properties. By contrast, if
normativity is a determinable, the pattern of normative explanations is like
the pattern of explaining color facts: we move from the specific to general.
The latter seems much more promising. That is: an act is normatively
valanced (colored) in virtue of being prima facie wrong (red), and prima
facie wrong (red) in virtue of being unjust (scarlet) or being harmful to
others (crimson) or whatever. And an act can also be normatively valanced
(colored) in virtue of being prudentially good (blue), and prudentially good
(blue) in virtue of being an achievement (teal) or being pleasurable (aqua).
These explanations start with the specific properties, and they don’t all start
in the same place.
C3.P80 Another motivation for X-First is that normativity is unified. Concerns
about whether a category is unified are often run together with concerns
about whether it is a genus. This occurs in the literatures on causation and
grounding (see Schaffer 2015, 2016: 152–3). And it occurs in metaethics.²¹
The thought seems to be: Unless there is a single essential feature of
normativity, how can normativity be one thing? Since the essential feature
of normativity is presumably normative (i.e. a feature like reasons or values
or fittingness), X-Firsters are home free. Or so it may seem.
²¹ Here’s Kearns and Star (2009: 215): “Philosophers have distinguished between
species of reasons in a number of ways (moral/prudential/aesthetic, practical/theoretical
etc.), but it is commonly thought that no unified and informative analysis of the genus is
possible.” Why must reasons be a genus? Why must its varieties be species of reasons?
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C3.P81 It may also seem that Stark Alternative is hopeless on this front. After all,
the view holds that normativity is fundamentally disjunctive. A common,
recurring line of thought in metaethics has been that this entails disunity:
C3.P82 If what it is to be a reason were fundamentally disjunctive, then reasons would have
about as much in common as pieces of jade, which, beyond being called “jade”, have
no more distinctively in common than do moons of Jupiter and natural numbers
smaller than 17. (Schroeder 2007: 69; see also 60)²²
C3.P83 Two points here. First, I’ll play defense. Arguments like Schroeder’s are
meant to show that any fundamentally disjunctive analysis is disunified. But
consider the rhetorical use of gruesome, gerrymandered disjunctions like
jadeite-or-nephrite or, to use an example from Michael Smith (2017: 102),
“numbers-or-dogs.” The problem with jadeite-or-nephrite—that is, NaAl-
Si₂O6-or-Ca₂(Mg,Fe)₅Si₈O₂₂(OH)₂—and numbers-or-dogs is what gets
disjoined, not the mere presence of “or.” (Indeed, X-Firsters can’t say the
disjunction is gruesome just because of the “or”; in a crucial sense that’s
often ignored, their views are disjunctive too.²³) Intuitively, an analysis of
color in terms of red-or-blue-or- . . . , and of red in terms of crimson-
or-scarlet-or- . . . , does not look at all like an analysis of anything in terms
of jadeite-or-nephrite or numbers-or-dogs.
C3.P84 This idea is common ground among those who think that determinables
are explained in terms of the disjunction of their determinates. As Rosen
(2010: 128) notes, not “any old disjunction of properties suffices to define a
determinable with the disjuncts as determinates.” What makes the disjunc-
tion of determinates different from any old disjunction is that they exhibit
sufficient objective yet inexact similarity: “objective” because the similarity in
question is not just located in something about us (e.g. we call distinct
minerals “jade”), but “inexact” because the similarity is not explained in
terms sharing a single more fundamental property.
C3.P85 This might sound opaque, but there are ways of cashing it out. Determi-
nates are more specific than determinables. But that’s not all that they are.
Red and square is not a determinate of red, even though it is more specific
than red: “For an object to have a determinate property is for that object to
have the determinable properties the determinate falls under in a specific
²² I point to some recurrences of this line of thought below. A kind referee noted
another: Schroeder (2015: 381) on analyzing practical and epistemic normativity.
²³ Why? Consider Fittingness First. It can’t hold that to be normative is to be
explained in terms of fittingness: after all, fittingness is normative, and can’t explain itself.
So the view must be that for x to be normative is for x to be fittingness or for x explained in
terms of fittingness. The same holds for Reasons First and Values First. Thanks to Daniel
Fogal and Chris Howard for helpful discussion of this point. See Shapiro (n.d.) for an
independent (and better) argument that X-First accounts must be disjunctive.
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way” (Funkhouser 2006: 548). One way of being red (e.g. scarlet) will
always differ from another (e.g. crimson), but it will differ along certain
dimensions: hue, brightness, saturation. Squareness has nothing to do with
these dimensions, so being red and square isn’t a way of being red.²⁴ This
talk of determination dimensions is central to how Funkhouser unifies
determinables. The dimensions that can determine a determinable generate
regions of “property space,” and that gives us an account of objective but
inexact similarity (proximity in property space), as well as conditions under
which a disjunction is a determinable (2006: 554–6; Fine (2011) takes a
similar approach in terms of regions of “state space”).
C3.P86 Applied to normativity, the task would be to specify the relevant deter-
mination dimensions, which would help us pick out the relevant determi-
nates. (We’d also need to specify the levels of determination.²⁵) The Virtues
First view sketched above is one option for proponents of Stark Alternative.
I’ve already implicitly suggested another (in terms of normative valences).
There are more. But I want to stick to the big picture of how Stark
Alternative accounts for the unity of normativity, which is via appealing to
how the determinates that are disjoined exhibit objective yet inexact simi-
larity, and thereby form a region of property space.
C3.P87 Even if you reject this appeal to “objective yet inexact similarity,” you
should acknowledge that metaphysicians are confident that some view can
be plugged into its place. As Wilson notes, “determinables clearly termino-
logically, metaphysically and formally unify their determinates,” and this is a
consensus point in the literature even though “philosophers very commonly
assume that determinables are reducible to disjunctions of determinates”
(2014: 568). This suggests that the view that disjunctiveness entails disunity
is, at least, highly metaphysically contentious. It’s not something that
metaethicists should take for granted, or defend via rhetorical appeals to
gerrymandered disjunctions like numbers-or-dogs.
C3.P88 So Stark Alternative can account for the unity of normativity and thereby
neutralize this motivation for being an X-Firster. But it can also do more: it
can offer a more satisfying account of the unity of normativity.
C3.P89 My case for this is similar to why some have proposed that other
philosophically interesting categories are best understood in terms of deter-
minables. For example, some suggest that taking the grounding relation to
be a determinable could capture how it is both “unitary and variegated”
²⁴ That said, conjunctive properties like being red and square are still partly explained
in terms of their conjuncts, and in that sense are still in a rough sense color properties. The
same holds for conjunctive properties where one conjunct is normative and the other is
non-normative. Thanks to Mark Schroeder for a very helpful discussion of this point.
²⁵ Thanks to a referee for noting this problem. I wish I knew how to solve it.
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(Bliss and Trogdon 2016: §1). Stark Alternative similarly promises to
account for how normativity is unified while capturing the deep variegation
in the varieties of the normativity.
C3.P90 To tease this out, return to how X-Firsters unify normativity. Say we’re
Reasons Firsters, and we say normativity is unified insofar as it is the
“domain of reasons.” That seems straightforward. But it isn’t. The view
doesn’t unify normativity unless we can unify reasons—or, more aptly,
unless we can unify the reasons relation.²⁶ And here challenges arise.
C3.P91 Consider the arguments for the view that some reasons are internal (or
desire-dependent) and for the view that some reasons are external (or desire-
independent). Reasons Firsters claim that we cannot accept both: that’d
make their account of normativity fundamentally disjunctive, and hence
disunified. It is in this context that we get Schroeder’s rhetoric about jadeite-
or-nephrite. Similarly, Sobel argues that, with respect to reasons internalism,
“the reasons provided by desires in matters of mere taste are the thin end of
the wedge.” If reasons were internal-or-external we’d end up with a “funda-
mentally disunited” account (2016: 297).²⁷
C3.P92 There are other similar challenges. Smith’s rhetoric about numbers-or-
dogs crops up in his discussion of putative differences between practical and
epistemic reasons. An account on which the two turn out to be fundamen-
tally different would, he says, make normativity a “ragbag.”
C3.P93 The general point is that there may be deep variegation in the varieties of
reasons relations, or more broadly in the varieties of normativity. Internal and
external reasons and practical and epistemic reasons aren’t the only
examples. Consider the deontic, the evaluative, and the aretaic; the moral,
the prudential, the aesthetic, the rational; and subjective (belief- or evidence-
relative) and objective (fact-relative) standards. They strike me as being
significantly and deeply distinct, in a way that the varieties of triangles
(obtuse and acute; equilateral and isosceles) do not. X-Firsters struggle to
explain such differences; that’s why Schroeder and Sobel think that because
they accept internal reasons, they must deny the existence of external
reasons. But Stark Alternative makes space for such deep variegation in
²⁶ As I noted in my (2019), unifying causes (e.g.: they’re all events) does not unify
causation. The relatum is not the relation. Metaethicists sometimes focus on unifying
reasons (e.g.: they’re all propositions) but this unifies a relatum, not the relation itself.
²⁷ Some adopt such disjunctive accounts. On Chang’s hyrid view, “there is no
univocal answer to the question, What metaphysically makes a fact have the normativity
of a reason?” (2013: 177). But even some defenders of this view concede that it is
“metaphysically unsatisfying” because it is not a “unified account” (Behrends 2015:
172). See also Cuneo (2007: 64) for a different disjunctive approach to key normative
notions.
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the varieties of normativity because it can explain how normativity is unified
while also being fundamentally disjunctive.
C3.S10 3.3.4. Objections to Stark Alternative
C3.P94 I’ve offered an alternative view that is schematic, but well-motivated: it
better explains two central considerations that were thought to favor the X-
First program. There are, of course, objections to Stark Alternative. I won’t
discuss them all; some are technical issues that don’t strike at the core of the
view under consideration.²⁸ I’ll focus on the two deepest problems.
C3.P95 First, entailment. A common view is that determinates entail the relevant
determinable.²⁹ If this is right, it poses problems for various ways of spelling
out Stark Alternative. Take a view on which normativity is a determinable
whose determinates are verdictive properties like rightness, and rightness is
in turn a determinable whose determinates are right-making properties. The
problem is that the presence of right-makers doesn’t entail rightness; they
can be defeated or disabled. (This mirrors a long-standing objection to
Ought First views about reasons.³⁰) One way to avoid this problem might
be take all determinables and determinates to be either prima facie or pro
tanto. But even then, problems could recur once we factor in how the
absence of enablers and the presence of disablers can block entailments. It
might be, then, that our model of the contributory properties must be
holistic to preserve such entailments (à la Fogal 2016).
C3.P96 Second, exclusion. A common view is that determinates at the same level
of determination exclude each other. A ball can’t be fully red and fully blue
at the same time. But it can be both morally and aesthetically good for Peter
Singer to gracefully scoop a drowning child out of a shallow pond: these
properties don’t exclude each other, even though they are putative determi-
nates at the same level of determination. This strikes me as a harder
²⁸ For instance, a determinate property must be attributed to the same object as its
determinable (see e.g. Berker 2017: n. 35), but reasons, fittingness, and value are not
attributed to the same objects. I think we can specify the relevant properties in such ways
that they are attributable to the same objects, but I admit that this requires work.
²⁹ One could also have the view that complex determinables generate a reverse
entailment: any object that instantiates the determinable (sound) must instantiate each
determinate (pitch, volume, timbre) at least to some degree. (Thanks to Jan Dowell and
Pekka Väyrynen here.) If so, this poses a similar problem. Perhaps some things can be
normatively valanced by being to some degree right and good, without being to any
degree virtuous or vicious. I think this problem might just arise from over-generalizing
from the case of sound. Something can have a taste by being sweet and/or salty, without
being to any degree sour or bitter. For examples, see most British culinary inventions.
³⁰ Cf. Toulmin (1950: ch. 11) and Schroeder (2007: 35–6), and for contemporary
responses to the problem see Nebel (forthcoming); Alvarez (2010); Broome (2004).
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challenge. But I’m not sure if it’s ultimately a successful one. I suspect that
the challenge arises only when we bring in totality facts: a ball can be red and
blue, but it cannot be fully red and fully blue. (What does “fully” contribute
beyond specifying that the ball is red, and that’s it?) Once we add in totality
facts in the normative case, the problem disappears. If it is aesthetically good
for Singer to gracefully scoop up the drowning child and that’s it, then it
cannot also be morally good for him to do so.
C3.P97 I’m not sure whether these responses to the problems above are adequate,
And they only scratch the surface of the challenges that we face in taking
normativity to be a determinable in the way that I’ve proposed. So let me
offer three further points about the project at this incipient stage.
C3.P98 First, these problems might beset some versions of Stark Alternative but
not others, depending on how we specify the determination dimensions and
so on. This is one reason why I’ve kept the account schematic. To get a sense
of some of the variety of options here, consider a different example of a
determinable: “Pitch, timbre, and loudness may be properties in their own
right, but many think they also combine to form a unity—the property
sound” (Funkhouser 2006: 553). One option for Stark Alternative would be
to take deontic, evaluative, and aretaic valences to be properties in their own
right which combine to form normativity. This is very different from the
Virtues First account sketched earlier. Just as an objection to Ought First
need not rule out X-First per se, an objection to (e.g.) Virtues First need not
rule out Stark Alternative per se.
C3.P99 Second, these problems might beset all versions of Stark Alternative, but
not all views in the ballpark. Stark Alternative says normativity is a deter-
minable. Certain commitments about the determinable–determinate rela-
tion may generate potential problems for the view. But perhaps we can water
down those commitments while keeping its motivations intact. Consider,
for instance, Bennett’s discussion of how to explain the unity of the
grounding relation by appealing to “resemblance classes”:
C3.P100 [R]esemblance classes are more straightforward and better understood
than talk of determinables or genuses. Indeed, I’m not entirely sure
what the difference is between a determinable property and the dis-
junctive property that is the result of disjoining the members of a
reasonably natural resemblance class. (2017: 20)
C3.P101 What would be an example of a reasonably natural resemblance class whose
members are unified when disjoined? You can probably guess:
C3.P102 Consider the colors. Whatever we take colors to be, and whatever exact kind of unity
is in play in this case, we can all agree that the colors form a unified family. That’s
why we have the general label “the colors”. But . . . [n]o one would say that the
determinable property being colored is more fundamental than the more determinate
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color properties like being red, being blue, and being green. Nor would anyone say that
really there is just one property—Color with a capital “C”?—which is very general,
can be had in different ways by quite different things, and whose pattern of
instantiation makes true all color sentences, like “this mug is red” and “my shirt is
black”. (2017: 23–4)
C3.P103 The colors form a resemblance class, even though there is no X—like being
colored, or Color, or whatever—that is “on first.” Given this, in virtue of
what do the colors form a resemblance class? On her view, “a family of
properties and relations are unified” as a resemblance class when they are
“objectively similar to each other”; or, more aptly, they are more or less
unified depending on whether they are more or less objectively similar
(2017: 19). This relies on a notion of objective, inexact similarity, as before.
But taking normativity to be a “natural resemblance class” may let us avoid
commitments that are thought to be definitive of determinables, without
putting just one property—or Normativity with a capital “N”—on first.
C3.P104 Third, even if all views in the ballpark of Stark Alternative face decisive
objections, I still don’t think we should all just agree that there’s some X “on
first” and merely disagree about what it is. The challenge from the previous
section remains: there seem to be many philosophically interesting categor-
ies that don’t obviously allow for, let alone insist upon, an X-First approach.
Taking normativity to be a determinable or a resemblance class is just one
way to depart from the X-First program.
C 3 . S 1 1 3.4. CONCLUSION
C3.P105 The “Who’s on first?” debate has pride of place in contemporary metaethics.
It’s high time we ask why. Why should we think that some normative
property or relation or concept is “on first”? And if nothing is “on first,” it’s
high time we provide alternatives to the X-First program.
C3.P106 I’ve tried to make progress on both fronts. But I want to conclude with a
methodological point about how the debate should proceed. The best path
is to see what we want from a general theory of normativity, then see what
models best fit those motivations. I’ve argued that we should want a model
on which normativity is like color in two ways: normative explanations go
from the more specific to the more general, and normativity can be unified
despite deep variegation between the varieties of normativity. I’ve argued
that these motivations point towards Stark Alternative, or at least something
like it. My main complaint about the X-First program is that it is Procrus-
tean. It does not start by investigating the nature of the phenomenon we
want to explain and looking at what models provide the best fit. It starts by
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assuming that some X must be on first, then tries to chop and change
normativity to fit the theory.³¹
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